EPL: Manchester City tactical review (Part 1)
Given how strong both Manchester City and Real Madrid appeared over the course of the 2011-12 season, one would have expected all manner of conjecture and hypotheses dwelling on their subsequent downfall. Yet there are surprisingly few write-ups on the topic, and fewer pattern analyses still.
Real, of course, started the season poorly, so there isn’t much to think about there: when Barcelona come at you with a vengeance, the least you can do is avoid giving them a ten-point handicap. But City’s deterioration was slower and more intriguing. Suggestions offered till date have focused on the obvious: burnout after a successful but grueling season; a lack of effective reinforcements over the 2012 summer; dressing-room politics; dictatorial management and the like (Somehow, no one looked at this PR disaster as a possible demotivating factor).
A tactical analysis reveals a few interesting points as the season progressed:
2012-13: Formation changes
A major change was the 3-5-2 formation that Roberto Mancini adopted at the start of the season. It was perhaps intended to give his side more options against defensive units in Europe, and we can see where he was coming from. The 3-5-2 has gained currency off late: Juventus, in particular, have been a successful model since Antonio Conte took over.
But that is a win for improvisation, not for ideology – Conte has tailored his formation to his side’s strengths. He has a regista (defensive playmaker) of the calibre of Andrea Pirlo at the base of the midfield. In the centre, he can call upon the varied skill-set of Arturo Vidal, complemented by the hard-working Marchisio; along the flanks, he can deploy two energetic wing-backs. All this allows Juve’s forwards to operate at will.
At City, however, the installed formation was more conventional: four at the back, a holding midfielder and another to link play, and attackers dispensed across the field. Mancini is tactically not the most imaginative of managers, but here he was trying – unsuccessfully – to fit his team to his formation, rather than the other way around.
So City scouted around for players who could effect these changes. First up was Inter wing-back Maicon. The experienced Brazilian combines speed with attacking potency, making him ideal for a 3-5-2 formation.
Next came Javi Garcia. Mancini favours two defensive midfielders, so Garcia could partner Gareth Barry as a holding midfielder, allowing Yaya Toure to charge forward into the space created further ahead.
Up front, Mancini had an excellent forward line – Sergio Aguero’s ruthlessness in front of goal, combined with Carlos Tevez’ high work-rate, makes them an excellent forward pair. Edin Dzeko could come off the bench to add his physicality to the mix when required. And Mario Balotelli, when not trying to get sent off for the sheer fun of it, was a useful Plan B.
So where did this go wrong?
For starters, Garcia at CDM was forgettable. None of the other new signings was impressive either, but this failure was particularly important for the ramifications it had across the field. His predecessor, Nigel de Jong, was a hard, feisty scrapper, ideal for a physical role in midfield.
Crucially, this allowed the likes of Yaya Toure to charge forward, confident there was someone to cover for him. Several times, bringing on de Jong effectively changed the game; not because of the player himself, but because of the freedom he afforded Toure. This happened noticeably against Newcastle in the closing stages of the 2011-12 title chase.
With Garcia underperforming, Toure played in a deeper role all season, unable to break into space as regularly as he would like. Consequently, the Ivorian failed to turn up in one match too many last season. In a summer spent chasing a galaxy of stars, City’s first signing in 2013-14 was a CDM: Fernandinho of Shakhtar Donetsk, costing 30 million pounds. Fernandinho offers a compelling presence in the centre of the field; breaking up play, shielding his defenders and winning the ball back. His presence at CDM will free up Toure for a greater forward presence.
At the back, Joleon Lescott’s removal from a three-man defence he was struggling in caused major damage to their defensive solidity. It is astonishing how a change involving the least talked-about, least expensive member of the entire squad could completely wreck their defence. But Lescott’s understanding with Vincent Kompany proved greater than the sum of its parts.
While Matija Nastasic proved competent on his own merits, he too did not like the three-man defence he was forced into. Neither did Gael Clichy, a left footed player now forced into defending with his right.
Elsewhere, Maicon and Aleksandr Kolarov were at sixes and sevens for much of the season. With no designated areas to cover, they looked unsure of their role; often charging up the pitch unnecessarily and finding themselves stranded when the other team had the ball.
Manchester City’s defensive record in 2011-12 was the best in the EPL, but in 2012-13 that defence could be rendered useless against a single pacy striker with two runners behind. It is little surprise that Lescott now appears to have been restored to the starting lineup, with City reverting to a more conventional 4-4-2 (or 4-4-1-1), while Maicon has left for Roma.
The lingering effect of these repeated tweaks would be felt long into February, when City trailed the leaders by 13 points. This time, it was one bridge too far.
Lack of imagination
Mancini lacks tactical flexibility, or the ability to react to changes that contemporaries like Jose Mourinho do. He prefers to adopt a strategy at the start of a match, and carry it through regardless. Noticeably, he disliked using conventional wingers; instead preferring wide midfielders like James Milner or playing David Silva as an inside forward.
Against Wigan in the FA Cup final, City’s shape was particularly narrow: he did not start Milner, allowing Wigan’s Roger Espinoza to bomb down the left at will and overload FB Pablo Zabaleta. Later, McManaman began doing the same on the right wing, with the unprotected Zabaleta forced into some rash challenges, finally getting sent off.
In Europe, Mancini’s formations lacked clarity. He paired Nastasic and Kompany (together for the first time) against a side of the caliber of Real Madrid. Carlos Tevez was used (alone) against Ramos and Varane, two centre-backs considerably huger than him; but later benched against sides where his experience could have helped.
Perhaps they were unlucky: their group mates were all fellow league champions, holding greater experience in Europe. But there is little doubt that the side seemed to lack pedigree: for the then EPL title-holders to finish as the worst English team in Champions League history (3 points from six games) was an ignominious failure.
Sometimes, it is the minor details that can lead to one’s undoing. Mancini’s attempt to foist a new playing style on City disrupted key elements of their fabric, while his aloof, hands-off approach at management further alienated his players off the pitch.
(Part 2 : What Pellegrini’s side might look like will follow next week)