Tactical Tweaks: Rise of the 4-2-3-1
Formations have always been one of the focal points of any team’s tactical set up. And over time, formations have been loved, hated, modified and manipulated to suit the ever changing needs of the constantly evolving modern game. Brazil’s 1970 “Magic Box” (4-2-2-2), England’s 1966 Wingless Wonders, Ajax’s Totaalvoetball are all examples of formations tweaked to enthrall the masses with its tactical ingenuity. Italy’s Catenaccio is a standout example of infamous formations, for its notorious ‘anti-football’ and ultra defensive characteristics.
And like so many times before, another formation has come to the fore in recent times – the 4-2-3-1. So in this article, I’ll look to elaborate on the formation, break it down to get you its tactical pros and cons and just why it has gained unprecedented popularity to supersede the 4-4-2 as the preferred formation of top sides in the world today.
Overview
The system came to prominence with United’s 2008 title winning side, which constantly switched from a 4-6-0 to a fluid 4-2-3-1 with Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo switching positions within the front 4. But this occasional ‘tweak’ employed by Sir Alex was capitalized on by none other than Jose Mourinho, who used it to excellent effect on his way to a treble with Inter in 2010. Fast forward to Euro 2012, and more than half the sides in the competition played with a 4-2-3-1, including Germany and Poland. European Champions Chelsea too played with a 4-2-3-1, and continue to do so. The 4-2-3-1’s meteoric rise to fame is evident in the fact that out of the four semi finalists in this season’s Champions League, three of them (Real Madrid, Bayern Munich, Borussia Dortmund) make use of the formation.
Tactical Strengths
The 4-2-3-1 employs the usual back four, with two central midfielders, three attacking midfielders and one centre forward. The entire dynamics of the formation rest predominantly with the five midfielders, bestowing the formation with its strengths and weaknesses. The two men sit in front of the back four and can be assigned roles accordingly. Usually, one of them is a conventional defensive midfielder (preferably a ball winning one) who patrols the line and wins the ball back with his strong tackling. The second midfielder is usually a deep lying playmaker who distributes the ball to the three attacking midfielders. Weaker teams can employ one midfielder as an anchor man to add defensive steel, or can use two defensive midfielders altogether to create a defensive formation. Sunderland used the latter to decent effect a few years back, with Albanian captain Lorik Cana and midfield wrecker-in-chief Lee Cattermole combining to make a unit that was difficult to break down in the middle. The formation is also the best in terms of efficiently making use of a player role I would designate as the “complete mid”, a player who can do a little bit of everything. In a versatile formation, the presence of such a midfielder offers more options going forward, good examples would be Ilkay Gundogan, Xabi Alonso and Esteban Cambiasso, who can pass, shoot, control the tempo of the game, keep possession and run their socks off when the opportunity presents itself.
The 3 attacking midfielders are also equally important for the formation to tick, but they essentially depend on the two central midfielders to give them the ball. The attacking trio also allows the team to incorporate attacking versatility, which allows the team to focus on defensive weaknesses of the opposition. For example, Real Madrid uses the trio of Ronaldo, Ozil and Di Maria to scintillating effect due to their differences in playing style. While Di Maria is an out and out winger and looks to beat his man with searing pace to get to the line, Ronaldo on the left is more like an inside forward as he rarely drifts outside to cross and prefers cutting inside to shoot. Ozil is as good as an advanced playmaker as they come, linking with the other 4 in attack to create chances in the final third. The centre forward should preferably drop deep to link with the attacking trinity, and also needs to be somewhat of a complete forward, to be competent enough to deal with the service to him by the attacking midfielders/wingers/ advanced playmakers.
Tactical Weaknesses
Football is a game which works very strongly on the concepts of positive and negative space. This creation of space is vital to exploit the weaknesses of the opposition. The 4-2-3-1 fails to cover the gaping hole between the attacking midfielder and the corresponding full back. This gap is caused due to the tactical requirement that the attacking midfielder mark the opposition full back to keep him caged in his half. This problem can be solved by having a player like Jakub Blaszczykowski or James Milner on the wings, both of whom put in amazing workman like shifts at both ends, or by employing a defensive winger (which defeats the purpose of having 3 attacking midfielders.) But under normal circumstances, opposition wingers or wide midfielders can drop into this space to cause problems for the 4-2-3-1, as was seen in Chelsea’s season when Eden Hazard was criticized for not tracking back, and as Jonathan Wilson correctly noted (Has the 4-2-3-1 lost its gloss? –The Guardian) in the 2010 World Cup, where Robinho dropped into this space because of Arjen Robben’s reluctance to adhere to his defensive duties, eventually scoring in the first half. This space also causes further problems if the full back tries to mark the player who drops into it to get the ball, causing a space to open up behind the full back, which can be exploited by the opposition’s forward or an overlapping full back.
Another dilemma that the 4-2-3-1 offers, is regarding the deep lying playmaker among the two central midfielders. If he is either tightly marked (jail-marked to be precise, like Michael Essien’s choking job on Steven Gerrard in a 2007 tie between Chelsea and Liverpool) or if the defensive midfielder has an off day, it would mean less possession for the deep lying playmaker. This could leave the front 4 with no service at all, causing them to drop deeper to get the ball, isolating the centre forward in the process.
But everything taken into account, sides like Chelsea, Bayern Munich, Real Madrid and Dortmund have shown that that the 4-2-3-1 offers enticing prospects going forward and if enforced properly can get you a lot of goals. Considering that Messi, Ronaldo, Bale, Hazard, Ribery, Robben, Gotze and Reus are all basically wide attacking midfielders, the 4-2-3-1 could yet gain more prominence as one of the most tactically proficient formations available to managers today.